Abstract-We study pricing games in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. Each node (1) makes a bid to each of its customers, specifying a charging function and a proposed traffic share, and (2) allocates its received traffic to its service providers. A node aims to maximize its profit from forwarding traffic. We show that the socially optimal routing can always be induced by an equilibrium where no node can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its bids. Inefficient equilibria arise in oligopolies due to the monopolistic pricing power of a superior relay. It results in finite price of anarchy if marginal cost functions are concave, but unbounded price of anarchy when they are convex. Pricing games of general topology suffer from the intrinsic multi-hop network structure, which gives rise to infinite price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that cooperation in network routing cannot be achieved among autonomous and selfish nodes unless sufficient incentives, typically in the form of payments, are provided to the nodes [1] - [4] . A node is willing to participate in routing only if it can charge more than the cost for forwarding traffic. While a selfish node prices its service with the ultimate aim of maximizing its profit, charging its customers excessively risks losing market share to its competitors.
In this work, we study the game that arises from the pricing competition among relay nodes in a multi-hop relay network with one source and one destination. In this game, each node is a service provider to a group of nodes (its customers), and when it needs to forward the traffic received from its customers, the node itself becomes a customer that uses the services of some other group of nodes. As a service provider, the node announces (1) charging functions which specify the payments it demands depending on the amount of traffic the customers route to the node and (2) proposed traffic shares which help customers decide on a traffic allocation in case they are indifferent among multiple allocations. 2 As a customer, the node allocates its total incoming traffic to its service providers in a way that minimizes the sum of its own transmission costs and the payments made to the service providers. It turns out that a relay needs only its neighbors' bids to calculate its optimal bids (charging functions and proposed traffic shares). Such a game can exist in both wireline and wireless networks, where communication consumes resources and nodes are often selfish agents. The competition modelled by the game is especially applicable in large-scale or ad hoc networks, where a node is typically aware of its neighbors only.
We show that the pricing game always has Nash equilibria where no node can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its bids. The routing configuration at an equilibrium, however, may or may not be socially optimal. We show that the price of stability, defined as the ratio of the minimum cost at an equilibrium to the cost at the social optimum, is equal to one. On the other hand, the ratio of the maximum equilibrium cost to the cost at the optimum, or the price of anarchy, is finite for some link cost functions and topologies, but infinite for others.
Pricing schemes were introduced into network resource allocation problems first as a means of decomposing a global optimization into sub-problems solved by individual agents [5] . In addition to being a facilitating device, pricing serves as an essential mechanism for inducing social optimum when users (source nodes) selfishly choose their routes [6] . It is well known that without appropriate pricing, e.g. marginal cost pricing, selfish routing inevitably results in loss of efficiency, which in general can be arbitrarily large [7] , [8] .
When service providers are also mindful of their own interest, they will use pricing to their own advantage rather than to heed any social mission. With both users and service providers behaving selfishly, the network increasingly approximates a free market, where prices can assume various functions and lead to competition among service providers. For example, by modelling the interaction between the service provider and the users as a Stackelberg game, [9] shows that when the service provider adopts the profit-maximizing price, its revenue per unit bandwidth and the net utility of each user both improve with the number of users. When multiple service providers are present in a network, price competition inevitably ensues [10] - [12] . It is demonstrated in [10] , [11] that cooperation in pricing is in the best interest of service providers who jointly serve the same customers. The consequence of non-cooperation is analyzed in [12] , which shows that selfish pricing in parallelserial networks can result in arbitrarily large efficiency loss.
In this paper, we analyze the pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where a relay can compete for traffic from multiple nodes and can allocate its received traffic to multiple nodes. These networks have much richer topologies than, for example,
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the parallel-serial networks studied in [12] . A distinctive feature of the game is that each bid from a node includes a (possibly nonlinear) charging function, which specifies the payment contingent on the amount of service provided. Previous work on pricing games almost exclusively assume a constant unit price (linear charging function) from every service provider, which is reasonable if the users being charged each have infinitesimal traffic [6] , [7] , [12] , [13] . Our work is among the relative few that investigate the behavior of users with non-negligible traffic that can be arbitrarily split and sent to multiple service providers [8] . Thus, it becomes necessary to consider the use of general nonlinear charging functions to specify service fees. It turns out that the generalization from constant unit prices to nonlinear charging functions allows for a much richer set of possibilities in pricing games.
We show that the socially optimal routing can always be induced by an equilibrium of the pricing game. Therefore, the price of stability is one. However, inefficient equilibria also exist. We prove that the price of anarchy is equal to the number of relays in an oligopoly (single-layer parallel relay network) if marginal cost functions are concave. When marginal cost functions are convex, however, the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large. Unlike oligopolies, inefficiency in general pricing games stems mainly from the multi-hop structure of the network. We demonstrate that the inability of a relay to impact its upstream traffic allocation can lead to an infinitely large price of anarchy. Finally, we show that the analysis of the game is subject to only a minor modification when the source has elastic demand and access to congestion control.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Network Traffic and Multi-hop Routing
We consider a relay network represented by a directed graph G = (N , E) with one source s and one destination w, and a set of relays I which can be used to forward traffic in a multi-hop fashion from s to w. The source s needs to send traffic of a fixed rate 3 R s to w through links in E. We assume that there is no direct link between s and w. That is, traffic from s has to be routed to w via relays in a multihop fashion. We will frequently use the following terms. A (directed) path from node i to j is a concatenation of (directed) links from i to j. Define U h to be the set of nodes g such that there exists a path from g to h in the graph G. Such nodes are said to be upstream to h. To make matters simple, we assume G contains only nodes and links which are on a path from s to w. Since route discovery is not a main concern of this work, we assume such a G is given a priori, and is loop-free.
We assume that each node is aware of its neighbors, which can be categorized into three types (predecessors, siblings, and offsprings) as follows. For node i, h is a predecessor if (h, i) ∈ E. Denote the set of i's predecessors by P i . For any h ∈ P i , define S h i , {j 6 = i : h ∈ P j }. That is, S h i is the set of nodes which share the common predecessor h with i. These are the nodes which compete with i for h's traffic in the pricing game 3 We will discuss the problem involving an elastic session in Section V.
to be introduced later. We will refer to them as siblings of i with respect to h. Finally, i is said to be an offspring of h if (h, i) ∈ E. Let the set of h's offsprings be denoted by O h . The above notation is illustrated in Figure 1 . By our assumption on G, s is the only node without any predecessor while w is the only node without any offspring. It also follows that U s = ∅ and s ∈ U h for any relay h. Here, we make a simplifying yet plausible assumption that if i ∈ O h , then i / ∈ O g for all g ∈ U h . That is, if i can compete for h's traffic, i cannot compete for traffic at nodes upstream to h. Since the pricing game to be studied can arise only if there are multiple relays competing for the traffic from their common predecessor, we assume in G that every node i except w has multiple relays in
Denote the rate of flow on (i, j) ∈ E by f ij . It is implicitly assumed throughout the paper that f ij ≥ 0. A link flow vector f , (f ij ) (i,j)∈E is a routing of the session traffic if it satisfies the flow conservation constraints: P h∈Os f sh = R s , P k∈Pw f kw = R s , and for each relay i,
where r i denotes the incoming flow rate at i.
B. Link Cost and Charging Functions
Each link has a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function D ij (f ij ), with D ij (0) = 0. We assume D ij (·) is private information to i and j only. It can, for example, represent the queuing delay incurred on (i, j) with arrival rate f ij , e.g. the average occupancy function f ij /(c ij − f ij ) of an M/M/1 queue with service rate c ij . As another example, if the links are wireless, D ij (f ij ) can measure the transmission power required for achieving rate f ij . Suppose the link transmission rate f ij is determined by the transmission power P ij as f ij = W log(1+KP ij ) for some constants W, K > 0, 4 then
, which is strictly increasing and convex in f ij . For analytical purposes, we further assume that D ij (·) is continuously differentiable with derivative d ij (·). By previous assumptions, d ij (·) is positive and strictly increasing. The socially optimal routing is the routing that minimizes the network cost
Because link costs are strictly convex, the socially optimal routing is uniquely characterized by the condition that every path from s to w with positive flow 5 4 Assume that with proper time or frequency scheduling, transmission on different links are non-interfering. 5 The flow rate of a path is the minimum of the flow rates of all the links on that path.
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The source and relays act as selfish agents who must pay for the costs on their outgoing links. While the source has to send all its traffic out, it strives to do so with the minimum cost. On the other hand, a relay has an incentive to forward traffic only if it is adequately rewarded for its service in the form of payments, whose amount is determined as follows.
Each i ∈ O h announces a charging function P h i (·), with P h i (0) = 0, to specify the payment P h i (f hi ) it demands should h forward traffic of rate f hi to it. We assume that P h i (t) is continuously differentiable with the derivative being the pricing function p h i (t). Note that P h i (·) provides h a continuum of options, namely the rate-charge pairs (f hi , P
) i∈Oh , h decides on the allocation of its total incoming traffic and makes payments to its offsprings accordingly. 6 
C. Pricing Game
The pricing games starts with each relay announcing their bids to the respective predecessors. Then, the source allocates traffic to its offsprings in a way that minimizes its total payment. Upon receiving traffic and payments from its predecessors, each relay further allocates the traffic to its offsprings in the most cost efficient way. Since each relay must forward as much traffic as it receives, all the traffic originating at the source will travel to the destination. The payoff to each relay in this game is the profit it makes through servicing the traffic. In this section, we will introduce the pricing game in more detail.
1) Bidding Strategy:
For convenience, we adopt the equivalent charging model where a predecessor h pays B 7 When h allocates traffic in a way that minimizes its total payment, it takes its offsprings' proposal (γ h i ) i∈O h into consideration if there is a tie among multiple optimal allocations. We will specify the tie-breaking rule using (γ
2) Selfish Routing: Every node routes its total incoming traffic to its offsprings in the most cost efficient way. The routing is uniquely determined by the bids of the relays. To explain the mechanism, let's focus on the traffic allocation at an arbitrary node (source or relay) h and assume r h is given. 8 The traffic allocation of h can be characterized by routing variables φ hi , f hi /r h for all i ∈ O h [14] . Due to the flow conservation constraints (1), the vector of routing variables φ h = (φ hi ) i∈O h is feasible if it is nonnegative and P i∈O h φ hi = 1.
9
To minimize its total payment to offsprings, h always adopts a routing vector φ * h from the set
Denote the minimum value by
Since the set of feasible φ h is compact and the charging functions {B h i (·)} i∈Oh are continuous, A h must be non-empty. If A h has only one element, φ * h is uniquely determined. If A h has more than one element, the following tie-breaking rule specifies which allocation h chooses as φ *
where k·k denotes the Euclidean norm. It is easy to see that A * h is non-empty. If A * h is a singleton, let φ * h be the only element. Otherwise, h chooses φ * h to be the allocation in A * h with the highest rank under a predetermined lexicographic order.
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The above tie-breaking rule ensures that h's traffic allocation φ * h can be written as a function Φ h of its total traffic and its offsprings' bids, 12 i.e.,
The outgoing traffic from h to i thus is f hi = r h φ * hi .
With the above tie-breaking rule, routing throughout the network becomes a function of all the bids
It is realized as an outcome of each node allocating its incoming traffic selfishly to its offsprings (applying the tiebreaking rule if necessary) according to their bids. 8 The total traffic Rs at s is fixed, whereas the total traffic r h at a relay h is endogenously determined by the routing decisions of its upstream nodes U h . We will discuss the dependence of r h on upstream nodes' actions in more depth later. 9 If r h = 0, the value of φ h is irrelevant to the actual flow allocation. In this case, φ h is only required to be feasible. 10 Recall that γ h w is not specified by w. 11 For example, h can index its offsprings by 1, 2, · · · , |O h |. An allocation φ h is said to be lexicographically higher than φ 0 h if on the first coordinate j where φ h and φ 0 h differ, φ hj > φ 0 hj . 12 The use of (γ h i ) to generate a unique allocation in case of a tie first appeared in game theoretic economics literature, e.g. [15] .
3) Incoming Traffic Rate: Due to the topological relationship of U h with h, all traffic arriving at h must have (exclusively) gone through the nodes in U h . As a result, r h is a function of φ * g of all g ∈ U h , and r h is independent of the bids from h's offsprings. This fact is critical to understanding the relays' payoff functions, which are defined next.
4) Payoff Function:
The objective of selfish relays in forwarding traffic is to maximize their own profit. Thus, we define the payoff to a relay to be its profit as a function of its own as well as other relays' bids. Let Q −i denote the bids of all relays other than i. The payoff function of relay i is given by
On the RHS of (4), f hi , f ik denote the traffic on (h, i), (i, k) induced by the bids Q i , Q −i . Thus, the first summation represents the total revenue i earns from its predecessors. 13 The second summation is the total payment i makes to its offsprings. In (5), the second summation is replaced by D i (·) (cf. (2)) since P h∈Pi r h φ * hi = P k∈Oi f ik and (f ik ) k∈Oi must minimize i's total payment to its offsprings. Also (f hi ) h∈Pi is expressed in terms of r h and φ * h . Note that when Q −i is held fixed, r h stays constant. However, the routing decision by h, determined as
, is subject to change as Q h i is varied.
5) Static Pricing Game -Formal Definition:
• The set of players I = {relays in G} = N \{s, w}.
• Strategy of player i:
• Payoff to player i:
where (f ij ) (i,j)∈E is the selfish routing induced by
D. Best Response and Equilibrium
The best response set of i given Q −i is
For convenience, define
which gives the minimum payment by h for transmitting traffic r through its offsprings other than i. The best response set B i (Q −i ) can be characterized in terms of the bids from the neighbors of i only. 13 Recall that i receives payment B h i (f hi ) from h and pays D hi (f hi ).
Lemma 1:
where
(r h ) should it optimally route to both i andî h . Thus, the maximum revenue i could make through forwarding
It is then easy to see that Γ i (f i ; Q −i ) represents i's maximum profit by winning f hi from each h ∈ P i , and (f hi ) h∈Pi is i's optimal "market shares". Charging functions B h i (·) and proposed shares γ h i which satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 induce h to allocatef hi to i and give i the maximum profit. This is because (8) implies that allocating f hi to i and the rest toî h yields the same cost to h as allocating all the traffic toî h , while conditions (7) and (8) combined imply that no other allocation costs strictly less. Therefore, h's optimal allocations include, at least, (f hi , r h −f hi ) and (0, r h ), where the two components are the traffic allocated to i andî h , respectively. Condition (iii) ensures that h opts for the former allocation. Moreover, since h ends up paying B ĥ i (r h ), i has maximally realized its profit potential. For the rigorous proof, please refer to [16] .
Definition 1:
A bid profile Q I constitutes a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium if for any i ∈ I, Q i ∈ B i (Q −i ).
A central question is how the routing at a Nash equilibrium (simply referred to as equilibrium from now on) compares to the socially optimal routing.
Definition 2:
An equilibrium Q I is efficient if it induces the socially optimal routing. In this case, Q I is said to induce the social optimum.
Before proving the existence of equilibria and analyzing their efficiency in the general setting, we first study pricing games under some simple network topologies. These games not only provide valuable insight into the general problem but also have significant implications in their own right.
III. EQUILIBRIA IN OLIGOPOLY
The simplest topologies within our framework are those including a single layer of parallel relays, e.g. the one in Figure 2 . Here, N relays each have a direct link from s and a direct link to 
A. Best Response and Existence of Equilibria
We apply Lemma 1 to the oligopoly PG. Here,
Bî(t) = min
It is easy to show that Bî(t) is continuous and increasing. Its derivative, denoted by βî(t), is in general piecewise continuous. 14 By Lemma 1, a best response
where f * i maximizes
14 For t ∈ (0, R s ), let the left and right limits of βî(t) be denoted by βî(t) − and βî(t) + . It is understood that βî(0) has only a right limit and that βî(Rs) has only a left limit.
To gain an intuitive idea of the conditions concerning β i (·), suppose βî(R s − r) and λ i (r) are given by the dashed and solid curves in Figure 3 . A typical best response β i (r) is shown as the dotted curve. In particular, one can let β i (r) 
. Such a best response will be referred to as a replicating response. As we will show, oligopoly equilibria induced by replicating responses are always efficient while equilibria in general are not necessarily efficient.
B. Efficient Equilibria
Theorem 1: The socially optimal routing of an oligopoly can always be induced by an equilibrium. Therefore, the price of stability of an oligopoly pricing game is one.
Proof: We prove the result by constructing an equilibrium that induces the socially optimal routing (r * i ). Define λ * , min j=1,··· ,N λ j (r * j ). Let β i (r) ≡ λ * and γ i = r * i /R s for all i. Then β i (r) = βî(R s − r) = λ * satisfies (9) for all i with f * i = r * i . Since all the relays adopt the same constant pricing function, s is indifferent among all feasible allocations. However, (γ i ) N i=1 induces s to allocate r * i , equal to the optimal market share f * i , to each relay i. Therefore, (β i (·), γ i ) constitutes an efficient equilibrium. ¤ Because the socially optimal routing always exists, we can conclude that there always exists an efficient equilibrium for any oligopoly pricing game.
Although we used constant (β i (·)) (or linear charging functions 15 (B i (·))) to construct an efficient equilibrium in the proof of Theorem 1, efficient equilibria can be established by nonlinear charging functions as well. For instance, Figure 4 depicts an equilibrium in a duopoly PG where the two relays adopt β 1 (·), β 2 (·) of a more general shape with γ 1 = r * 1 /R s and γ 2 = (R s −r * 1 )/R s . Notice that in a duopoly, β1(t) = β 2 (t) and β2(t) = β 1 (t). Thus, r * 1 is the optimal market share to 1 while R s − r * 1 is optimal to 2. Although s is indifferent among all feasible allocations, it follows the proposed shares (γ 1 , γ 2 ) so that the two relays each get its optimal share.
To derive a simple criterion for checking equilibria's efficiency, we make the following distinction. A routing
is monopolistic if f m = R s for some relay m and f j = 0 for all j 6 = m. In this case, m is called the dominant relay. An equilibrium is monopolistic if it induces a monopolistic routing. A routing is competitive if at least two relays i, j have f i > 0, f j > 0. Such i and j are called competitive relays. An equilibrium is competitive if it induces a competitive routing.
Theorem 2:
If an oligopoly equilibrium is competitive, it must be efficient.
We will need the next lemma to prove Theorem 2. The proof of the lemma is omitted due to space limitations.
Lemma 2:
At an oligopoly equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let (f * i ) be the routing induced by a competitive equilibrium (β i (·), γ i ). Let m, n be any two competitive relays. It is enough to show that λ m (f * m ) = λ n (f * n ) and that λ m (f * m ) ≤ λ j (f * j ) for any j with f * j = 0. At the equilibrium, we must have
The best response condition (10) 
. So we are done. ¤
C. Inefficient Equilibria
An equilibrium may be inefficient if it is monopolistic. In Figure 5 , the socially optimal routing is (r * 1 , R s − r * 1 ) whereas the equilibrium depicted leads to a monopolistic routing (R s , 0). In this example, relay 2 proposes γ 2 = 0 and adopts β 2 (·) such that R Rs 0 β 2 (r) dr = R Rs 0 λ 2 (r) dr and β 2 (R s − r) > λ 1 (r) for all r ∈ [0, R s ]. Given 2's bid, relay 1 would want to acquire all the flow (cf. (10)) by proposing γ 1 = 1 and using β 1 (·) such that
Thus, relay 1's bid satisfies (9) and induces s to allocate R s to 1. On the other hand, having zero traffic is in the best interest of relay 2 given 1's bid. So the monopolistic equilibrium holds. Essentially, a monopolistic equilibrium arises when a relay bids others out of competition through manipulative pricing. The dominant relay can afford manipulative pricing thanks to its relatively superior cost function, as formalized in the next theorem, whose proof can be found in [16] .
Theorem 3:
If an oligopoly equilibrium is monopolistic with dominant relay m, we must have
for any other relay j.
Corollary 1:
If the socially optimal routing of an oligopoly is monopolistic, then every equilibrium of the oligopoly is monopolistic and efficient.
It can be shown that there always exists a monopolistic equilibrium in an oligopoly [16] . Thus, we have the following conclusion.
Corollary 2:
If the socially optimal routing of an oligopoly is competitive, then there exists an inefficient (monopolistic) equilibrium.
When an oligopoly has inefficient equilibria, it is of interest to compare the worst-case network cost under an inefficient equilibrium to the optimal cost.
D. Price of Anarchy
Definition 3: The price of anarchy ρ of a pricing game is
where F E is the collection of all routings that can be induced by an equilibrium of the game and F is the set of all feasible routings.
In this section, we study the price of anarchy specifically for oligopolies. As we will show, ρ is equal to N when marginal cost functions are chosen from the class of nonnegative, strictly increasing and concave functions. However, the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large when when marginal cost functions
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are chosen from the class of nonnegative, strictly increasing and convex functions. 16 Theorem 4: If the cost derivatives (λ i (·)) are nonnegative, strictly increasing and concave, ρ(N, (λ i (·)), R s ) of an oligopoly pricing game is upper bounded by the number of relays N . The upper bound is achieved when the marginal costs are identical and linear.
Proof: Let the socially optimal routing be (r * i )
where the coefficients (α i ) are nonnegative and sum to one. The optimal cost then is
Since
Recall that inefficient equilibria in an oligopoly are monopolistic such that the dominant relay m satisfies Theorem 3. The price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the cost at some monopolistic equilibrium (ME) to D * , is upper bounded as
Notice that (a) holds with equality if and only if R αiRs 0 λ i (r)dr = α Hence, all the relays must have the same strictly increasing and linear λ i (r). Thus, the optimal allocation is α i = 1/N for all i. This is exactly what is needed to make (c) tight. Now we specify the bids which induce the monopolistic equilibrium. Let β i (r) = λ(R s − r) , β(r) for every i, 17 γ 1 = 1 and γ i = 0 for all i 6 = 1. Since β i (r) is decreasing for every i, βî(r) = β(r) = λ(R s − r) for all r ∈ [0, R s ]. That is βî(R s − r) = λ(r), so that every relay is indifferent to having any amount of flow. Moreover, since any allocation that assigns R s exclusively to one of the relays is optimal to s, the proposed shares (γ i ) lead s to allocate f * 1 = R s and f * i = 0 to all i 6 = 1. Thus, the equilibrium holds. ¤ Unlike the selfish routing games in [7] , [8] , where the price of anarchy is independent of the topology [13] , Theorem 4 indicates that ρ(N, (λ i (·)), R s ) depends on topology through N when the λ i (·)s are concave. If the relays have convex λ i (·), however, ρ(N, (λ i (·)), R s ) can be arbitrarily large. Limited by space, we refer readers to [16] for the proof. 16 When the marginal cost functions in the second class are further restricted, as in the example D ij (·)'s in Section II-B, the resulting price of anarchy can be finite. 17 Here we have omitted the subscript of λ i (·) in light of the symmetry.
Theorem 5: For a fixed number N ≥ 2 of relays and for any M > 0, there exists an oligopoly (N, (λ i (·))
IV. FOCAL EQUILIBRIA
Although possible, inefficient equilibria in an oligopoly are very unlikely to occur. The example in Figure 5 is highly pathological since the monopolistic equilibrium is reached only if the subtle relationships between β 2 (·) and λ 1 (·) and between β 1 (·) and λ 2 (·) are satisfied. These relationships, however, can be established only by coincidence, since 2 cannot observe λ 1 (·) and 1 cannot observe λ 2 (·). Arguably, a relay is most likely to use a replicating response as described in Section III-A. We refer to the resulting equilibria as focal equilibria.
Definition 4:
A focal equilibrium of a general pricing game is an equilibrium where every relay i adopts the replicating response to other relays' bids Q −i , i.e., for all h ∈ P i ,
where (f hi ) h∈Pi are as specified in Lemma 1.
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A. Focal Equilibria in Oligopolies
We first investigate focal equilibria in oligopolies. Such equilibria are not only reasonable for implementation, but also, more importantly, always efficient.
Theorem 6:
The socially optimal routing of an oligopoly can always be induced by a focal equilibrium.
Proof: Note that the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is a focal equilibrium. ¤ Figure 4 illustrates a focal equilibrium in a duopoly induced by nonlinear B 1 (·), B 2 (·). Notice that all the curves in the figure intersect at the point corresponding to the social optimum. In fact, we can prove the following for general focal equilibria.
Theorem 7:
Every focal equilibrium of an oligopoly is efficient.
. We need to show that for any i with
) for all j 6 = i. By condition (10) and the fact that β i (·) is a replicating response to βî(·), at f *
Applying (10) and Lemma 2 to any j 6 = i, we have
18 Since the derivative β ĥ Therefore, λ i (f * i ) ≤ λ j (f * j ) for any j 6 = i, so we are done. ¤ From now on, we will focus on focal equilibria as we study general pricing games. 20 For brevity, we will drop the qualifier "focal" in the remainder of the paper.
B. Equilibria in General Pricing Game
Recall that a routing is socially optimal if and only if every path from s to w with positive flow has the minimum marginal cost among all paths from s to w.
Theorem 8:
The socially optimal routing of a general PG can be induced by an equilibrium.
While Theorem 8 is still proved by constructing pricing functions such that every β h i (·) is constant and equal to the minimum marginal cost on any path from h to w, showing that they constitute an equilibrium is not a trivial generalization of the proof for Theorem 2. For details, please refer to [16] .
C. Inefficient Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
Unlike oligopolies, not all focal equilibria of a general PG are efficient. The inefficiency is caused not only by the manipulative pricing of dominant relays but also by the multihop network structure. We illustrate this point with the example in Figure 6 each link, where M, ε and δ are positive constants such that M À εR s and M À δR s . Each node's bid is marked near the node. Of the three paths from s to w, (s, h, i, w) has the smallest marginal cost 4δr even when r = R s . So the optimal routing should allocate R s entirely to (s, h, i, w). The equilibrium in Figure 6 leads to only ε/(2δ) being routed on (s, h, i, w). In fact, s is indifferent among all allocations to h and g since β h (·) = β g (·) ≡ 2M + ε. Figure 7 explains why (β h (·), γ h ) and (β g (·), γ g ) are h and g's best responses. Notice that h can win only ε/(2δ) because it has cost λ h (r) = d sh (r) + d h (r) = 2M + 2δr. This inflated cost is a consequence of its offsprings' pricing. Since λ i (r) = 2δr is superior relative to λ j (r) = 2M + 2δr, i makes the maximum 20 We deliberately ignore the type of inefficient equilibria discussed in Section III-C since there is no new discovery we can make about them in the general PG. They are inefficient in oligopolies, and therefore inefficient in general PGs. Fig. 7 . Competition between h and g.
possible profit by replicating β j (·) ≡ 2M and proposing γ h i = 1. On the other hand, having zero profit and traffic is in j's best interest. Thus, Figure 6 represents an equilibrium.
The minimum-cost path (s, h, i, w) attracts only a small fraction of R s mainly because i charges much more than its true cost. It is, however, rational for i to do this since i has reaped the maximum possible profit in its competition with j. Unilaterally lowering β i (·) wouldn't attract more traffic because r h would remain at ε/(2δ) irrespective of i's action.
As shown above, focal equilibria of a general PG are susceptible to the inefficiency caused by the relays' inability to impact their upstream traffic. Such inefficiencies are intrinsic to networks with a multi-hop structure and can lead to arbitrarily large price of anarchy. For the example in Figure 6 , the cost at the equilibrium is
whereas the optimal cost is
Therefore, the price of anarchy is at least D E /D * , which can be made arbitrarily large by increasing M . In spite of this, there is a class of equilibria which are always efficient.
D. Everywhere Competitive Equilibria
Definition 5: An equilibrium of a general PG is everywhere competitive if (i) it induces routing (f ij ) such that f hi > 0 for at least two i ∈ O h whenever r h > 0 unless w ∈ O h and f hw > 0;
The pricing scheme in (ii) represents honest pricing by i. Here,f h 0 i is the flow i intends to acquire from h 0 ,
) is the derivative of the minimum cost to i for forwarding traffic to its offsprings. Thus, β h i (t) equals the actual cost for i to forward (potential) flow from h. Since 21 Recall that we have assumed in Section II-A that either O h contains at least two relays or O h = {w}.
22 Node i need not use honest pricing for h 0 if r h 0 > 0. Moreover, i can submit any bid γ h i ∈ [0, 1] to h. r h = 0, any bid by i is a best response. We assume honest pricing in order to rule out absurd equilibria resulting from arbitrary pricing by offsprings of h.
We have seen from Theorem 2 that competitiveness leads to efficiency in oligopolies. The next theorem generalizes this observation to multi-hop PGs. The proof is included in [16] .
Theorem 9:
If an equilibrium of a general PG is everywhere competitive, it must be efficient.
V. PRICING GAME WITH ELASTIC SOURCE In this section, we show that pricing games with an elastic source can be studied within the same framework developed for the inelastic case. Let s's preference over different admitted rates r s be measured by a utility function U s (r s ) such that U s (r s ) = U s (R s ) for all r s ≥ R s , i.e., R s is the maximum desired service rate of s. In [0, R s ], U s (·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, concave with continuous derivative u s (·). Taking the approach of [17] , we define the overflow rate f sw , R s − r s . Thus, at s we have X i∈Os fsi + fsw = Rs.
Let D sw (f sw ) , U s (R s )−U s (r s ) denote s's utility loss from f sw being rejected. Equivalently, if f sw is thought to be routed on a virtual overflow link directly from s to w [17] , D sw (f sw ) then represents the cost on the overflow link when its flow rate is f sw . Moreover, as defined, D sw (f sw ) is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and convex in f sw on [0, R s ]. Denote the derivative of D sw (t) by d sw (t) = u s (R s −t). Thus, we can treat the pricing game with an elastic source as one with an inelastic source of rate R s and an overflow link (s, w). Such an oligopoly pricing game is illustrated in Figure 8 , where the overflow link is represented by a dashed arrow. Such an oligopoly is essentially the same as those studied in Section III with the exception that w now competes with relays using a uniformly-zero charging function P s w (·) (or B s w (r) = D sw (r)). In a general PG, the introduction of the overflow link affects only the local competition faced by i ∈ O s . Specifically, the charging function of i's virtual competitor is derived as where the minimization is taken over ((f sj ) j∈S s i , f sw ) such that P j f sj + f sw = r. The conclusions for pricing games with an elastic source are almost verbatim to those for inelastic pricing games. Limited by space, we do not elaborate further.
VI. CONCLUSION This work presented a game-theoretic analysis of price competition in multi-hop relay networks. The introduction of possibly nonlinear charging functions led to a much richer set of results than if only constant unit prices were allowed. While the socially optimal routing can always be induced by an equilibrium, inefficient equilibria may also exist. The existence of competition turns out to be a two-sided coin. On the one side, any (everywhere) competitive equilibrium in oligopoly and general PGs must be efficient. On the other side, we found that the price of anarchy of an oligopoly with concave marginal costs is equal to the number of competitors, suggesting that more intense competition only makes inefficient (monopolistic) equilibria even worse. Efficiency loss can be still worse when marginal cost functions are convex, in which case the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large. Inefficient equilibria in a general PG are attributed to the fundamental multi-hop structure of the network. We demonstrated that the price of anarchy due to the multi-hop effect is unbounded.
